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Abstract
Introduction and Aims. Reducing the legal drink-drive limit from 0.08% to 0.05% blood alcohol concentration (BAC)
can reduce road trafﬁc accidents and deaths if properly enforced. Reduced limits may be opposed by alcohol retail and
manufacturing industries on the basis of commercial impact. Our aim was to qualitatively explore how a reduction in the
drink-drive limit from 0.08% to 0.05% BAC in Scotland, was experienced by bar owners or managers, including any resul-
tant changes in customer drinking or business practice. This is the ﬁrst study of this type. Design and Methods. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 16 owners and managers of on-trade premises in Scotland in 2018, approximately
three years after the drink-drive limit was reduced. Data were analysed using thematic analysis. Results. Most participants
reported no long-term ﬁnancial impact on their business, but a few, mainly from rural areas, reported some reduction in alco-
hol sales. Observed drinking changes included fewer people drinking after work or leaving premises earlier on weekdays. Adap-
tations to businesses included improving the range of no/low-alcohol drinks and food offered. Changes such as these were seen
as key to minimising economic impact. Discussion and Conclusions. Opposition to legislative measures that impact on
commercial interests is often strong and receives signiﬁcant public attention. This study found that Scottish businesses that
adapted to the drink-drive limit change reported little long-term economic impact. These ﬁndings are of international relevance
as potential BAC limit reductions in several other jurisdictions remain the subject of debate, including regarding the impact on
business. [Sumpter C, Mohan A, McKell J, Lewsey J, Emslie C, Fitzgerald N. How did a lower drink-drive limit
affect bar trade and drinking practices? A qualitative study of how alcohol retailers experienced a change in policy.
Drug Alcohol Rev 2020;39:170–179]
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Introduction
Road trafﬁc accidents (RTA) caused by people driving
under the inﬂuence of alcohol (drink-driving) are
responsible for 373 000 deaths world-wide annually
[1] The number of fatalities in Great Britain in inci-
dents where at least one driver was over the drink-drive
limit rose to 250 in 2017, the highest ﬁgure since 2009
[2]. There is good evidence that RTAs can be reduced
when blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limits for
driving (drink-drive limit) are lowered and actively
enforced [3–7].
One hundred and seventy-one countries have a
drink-drive limit; 70% of these have a BAC limit of
50 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood (0.05%) or
lower [1]. A recent meta-analysis of studies that inves-
tigated the impact of lowering BAC limits found that a
0.05% limit was more effective in lowering fatal RTAs
than a 0.08% limit [8]. This analysis found that a
0.05% limit led to an 11% reduction in fatal RTAs
compared to a 9% reduction for a 0.08% limit, and
estimated that 1790 lives could be saved in the USA if
the drink-drive limit in all its states was lowered to
0.05% [8].
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In Scotland the BAC limit is now 0.05% following a
reduction from 0.08% on 5 December 2014 [9].
England, Wales and Northern Ireland now remain the
only parts of the European Union to retain the higher
0.08% limit [10]. The new Scottish BAC limit applies
to all drivers regardless of age, length of time qualiﬁed
or vehicle type. Under the Scotland Act 2012, the Scot-
tish Government was granted power to lower the
drink-drive limit, but not to introduce measures such
as random breath testing [11]. The government’s deci-
sion to lower this limit was guided by a UK report
which estimated that a 0.05% limit would reduce
RTAs and save between 3 and 17 lives each year in
Scotland [12]. A majority of responses to a public con-
sultation at the time supported the lower limit [13],
however, a recent quantitative study found that change
was not associated with a reduction in RTAs, possibly
due to inadequate enforcement [14]. The limit change
was accompanied by an educational campaign to
inform the public.
Alcohol consumption is relatively high in Scotland,
with adults buying an average of 10.2 L of pure alcohol
per person per year [15], compared to global and
European averages of 6.4 and 9.8 L respectively [1].
There are 11 587 premises licensed to sell alcohol,
approximately one for every 379 adult residents [16].
Around 27% of alcohol sold is from ‘on-trade’ pre-
mises, that is, sales for consumption on the premises
which sold the alcohol such as pubs, restaurants, clubs
and bars [16].
Despite widespread support, the lowering of the
drink-drive limit in Scotland was opposed by some
individuals, hospitality organisations and alcohol pro-
ducers [13,17]. Media reports of industry-provided
data described a ‘devastating’ impact on on-trade pre-
mises, with ‘millions of pounds lost…as people stay at
home or consume soft drinks’ [17]. Reports also
claimed that the lower limit had contributed to pre-
mises closures [18] and particular concern was
expressed about the impact on businesses in rural or
tourist areas [19]. Similar concerns of the potential
impact on tourism and hospitality revenue if the BAC
limit was reduced to 0.05% have been expressed by
alcohol producers and hospitality organisations in
Canada [20] and the USA [21,22].
The recent study evaluating the impact of the lower
0.05% BAC limit in Scotland found that this was asso-
ciated with a small reduction (−07%, −08 to −05;
P < 00001) in sales from on-trade premises, with no
such association for sales from premises where alcohol
is not consumed, for example, supermarkets, conve-
nience stores [14]. The recent meta-analysis of studies
evaluating this impact in other countries found that
there was no signiﬁcant impact on overall alcohol con-
sumption measures [8].
The aim of this study is to explore the experiences
of owners and managers of premises licensed to sell
alcohol for consumption on the premises regarding the
lower 0.05% BAC limit in Scotland, including how
their business practices and customer base and behav-
iours have been affected. To our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst study to explore this topic with licensees. The
objectives of this study were to understand: (i) how
retailers of alcohol for on-premises consumption, pre-
pared for, experienced and responded to a lower
drink-drive limit in the three years following imple-
mentation; (ii) how, if at all, the lower drink-drive limit
affected consumer types, behaviours and practices in
on-premises drinking establishments; and (iii) what
ﬁnancial or other impact, if any, the lower limit was
perceived to have on on-premises alcohol retail
businesses.
Methods
We conducted a qualitative interview study with on-
premises alcohol retailers. A qualitative approach was
chosen in order to gain insight into experiences, and
the meanings behind those experiences, in relation to
the drink-drive limit change (referred to as the limit
change from here on) [23].
Sample
We took a purposive sample of owners or managers of
a variety of on-trade premise types, including pub
companies or ‘pubcos’, in terms of ownership, location
(urban/rural) and gender (Table 1). Rurality of pre-
mises was determined using the Scottish Government
six-fold urban rural classiﬁcation; this is based on the
population number and/or distance of an area in rela-
tion to areas of 10 000 people or more in Scotland
[24]. Our aim was to select participants who possessed
speciﬁc characteristics to illuminate the phenomena
being studied [25]. Several participants were rec-
ommended by the co-ordinator of an accreditation and
awards scheme for alcohol retailers known as ‘Best Bar
None’ (BBN) [26]. The recommendations were based
on the co-ordinator’s knowledge of the applications
made by alcohol retail premises to the BBN awards
scheme and were reported as likely to have been proac-
tive in responding to the limit change, for example, via
alternative drinks or travel options for customers. In
these cases, BBN approached premises on our behalf
to provide information about the study, and we
followed up. Remaining interviews were arranged by
telephoning venues identiﬁed through internet
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searches and direct knowledge. These venues were
chosen to boost the rural/urban split of the partici-
pants. Informed consent was sought in writing; not all
participants had access to email, so some gave audio-
recorded consent. A small number (fewer than ﬁve)
declined to participate for reasons of time, or lack of
interest.
In total, we recruited 16 participants from 15 pre-
mises including: 11 independent free trade (indepen-
dently owned and operated businesses); three
managed pubs or clubs (part of a chain of establish-
ments owned by a company and the manager is an
employee); and one leased pub (leased from a com-
pany such as a brewery, and usually tied to selling their
products). The 16 participants included six managers,
nine owners and one ‘pubco’ business development
manager. All worked in on-trade premises at the time
of the limit change and relevant work experience
ranged from six to 46 years. Participant characteristics
are described in Table 1.
Data collection
We used individual interviews to protect the identity of
participants and enable open discussion of business
practices. This approach has been successfully used in
previous studies conducted with bar owners and other
retailers [27]. One interview took place as a paired
interview with senior staff from one business which
owned several venues.
Participants were provided with an information sheet
in advance. The consent process included a reminder
of the purpose of the study, procedures for
Table 1. Participant characteristics
No. Role
Duration in
role, years Gender Premise type Business model
Urban/
rurala Recruitment
1 Manager 25 M Hotel, bar and
restaurant
Managed pub
(Large chain)
Urban BBN
2 Owner 21 F Bar and
restaurant
Independent free
trade
Urban BBN
3 Owner 25 M Hotel, pub and
restaurant
Independent free
trade
Rural Direct
4 Manager 5 F Pub Managed pub
(small chain)
Urban BBN
5 Ownerc 33 M Pub and
restaurant
Independent free
trade
Urban BBN
6 Owner 22 M Pub Independent free
trade
Urban BBN
7 Managerb,c Unknown F Nightclub Managed club
(small chain)
Urban BBN
8 Managerb,c Unknown F Nightclub Managed club
(small chain)
Urban BBN
9 Owner 25 M Nightclub Independent free
trade
Urban BBN
10 Manager 7 F Pub Independent free
trade
Urban BBN
11 Owner 12 F Restaurant Independent free
trade
Urban BBN
12 Owner 29 F Hotel, pub and
restaurant
Independent free
trade
Rural Direct
13 Owner 8 F Hotel, pub and
restaurant
Independent free
trade
Rural Direct
14 Business
development
manager
6 M N/A Tied tenanted/
leased pubs
N/A Direct
15 Manager 46 M Pub Independent free
trade
Urban BBN
16 Owner 14 M Hotel, pub and
restaurant
Independent free
trade
Rural Direct
aUrban area = population of 10 000 or more people; rural area = population of less than 10 000 people and within a minimum
drive-time of 30 min from an urban area. bPaired interview. cFace to face interview. BBN, Best Bar None; F, female; M, male;
N/A, not applicable.
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conﬁdentiality, that participation was voluntary, and
that they could withdraw from the study at any point.
Fifteen interviews were conducted by CS (n = 10),
AM (n = 3) and NF (n = 2) between November 2017
and February 2018. All interviewers are experienced
qualitative researchers educated to PhD (NF and AM)
or MSc level (CS). Interviews were conducted mainly
by telephone (n = 13) as we have previously used this
to facilitate participation in alcohol policy studies
[28,29] and as there is no clear evidence that face to
face interviews elicit better data [30]. Participants were
given the option of being interviewed face to face; one
paired and one individual interview were conducted
this way (Table 1). No one else was present with the
interviewer(s) during the interviews, but participants
were often located in their premises therefore other
people may have been present at their end.
Interviews lasted 20 to 40 minutes. A topic guide
was used to facilitate discussions (Table 2 for over-
view). This was developed by NF, CS and AM, and
was discussed and reﬁned following the ﬁrst interview.
Participants were not known to the interviewers before
being contacted. They appeared engaged and open
with a strong willingness to share their opinion and
experiences. All interviews were audio-recorded and
transcribed verbatim by professional transcribers. All
transcripts were sent to interviewees to check for accu-
racy and provide an opportunity to elaborate or clarify
any points, although none took this opportunity.
Analysis
Thematic analysis [31] was used. We used NVivo 11 to
manage and sort the data. Initially, CS and AM ran-
domly selected four transcripts and independently
coded two each using a combined deductive (based on
the study’s aim and objectives) and inductive (based on
emerging concepts and patterns in the data) approach.
Next, CS and AM met to discuss the codes and
grouped them according to similarity or relatedness to
form an initial coding framework. This was reviewed by
NF and reﬁned. CS applied this framework to eight
other transcripts and then met with NF and AM to dis-
cuss and reﬁne the coding framework. CS then applied
this framework to the ﬁnal three transcripts, and met
with NF and AM to discuss the ﬁnal themes and sub-
themes that resulted from the groupings of codes in the
framework; this resulted in a ﬁnal thematic framework
(Table 3). The themes and sub-themes were also dis-
cussed with JM, JL and CE in relation to a larger study
exploring the limit change. All authors commented on
drafts of the ﬁndings.
Ethics
Ethical approval was granted by the University of
Stirling’s General University Ethics Panel in May 2017
(GUEP134).
Results
Overall, participants reported that the limit change was
widely known about in the licensed trade prior to its
introduction, due to publicity in the mainstream media
and specialist trade press. Most were supportive of the
limit change. The ﬁndings centre on four main themes:
(i) impact on business proﬁts; (ii) changes in customer
drinking behaviour and practices; (iii) changes in cus-
tomer travel and transport options; and (iv) business
adaptations. These are discussed below.
Impact on business proﬁts
Most participants reported that prior to the limit
change, there was little concern about the potential
impact the change would have on their own business,
although many felt it would impact on the hospitality
industry as a whole. Post-limit change, most partici-
pants felt there had been no overall impact on their
proﬁts. A few reported a short-term impact that had
lasted six to 12 months, but had seen proﬁts return to
normal after this period. A small minority reported a
signiﬁcant and persisting ﬁnancial impact on their
business and a similar number reported a smaller
persisting ﬁnancial impact. Rural pubs were more
likely to report a negative economic impact while
urban food-led establishments were less likely to report
this as customers had continued to eat out while
switching alcohol for soft drinks. Estimates of the size
Table 2. Participant interview guide overview
Question
1 General questions on the licensed premises and context
of the licensed premises
2 Opinion and predicted impact of the limit change. Any
preparations made
3 Impact on levels of trade (footfall, net proﬁt, other)
4 Change in drinking behaviour (customer response to
limit change)
5 Business response to the limit change including:
• Changes/diversiﬁcation in drinks range
• Special offers/promotions
• Travel-related changes
6 General views of drink-driving and the licensed trade in
Scotland
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of the economic impact varied from ‘a couple of pints
a day’ to around £300 per week in sales.
‘I won’t stand here and claim it was completely and
utterly detrimental to my business…what it did do
was the amount of people coming in, if you look at
the revenue that raised…It was the equivalent of
about £300 to £400 a week’. [3: male; owner;
independent free trade; hotel, pub and restau-
rant; rural]
Table 3. Thematic framework including themes, sub-themes and deﬁnitions
Theme 1: Impact on business proﬁts
Sub-theme Deﬁnition
1.1 Predicted business
impact
Predicted impact of the limit change on own and others’ venues at the time of introduction.
Includes both negative (e.g. loss of customers, closing down) and positive (e.g. new ideas for
business).
1.2 Financial/business
impact
Impact seen in customer numbers, revenue and proﬁt, and volume sold. Any offset against new
sources of revenue or changed behaviours.
1.3 Mitigating factors Contextual elements that also contributed to changes reported e.g. unrelated trends in alcohol
consumption (‘confounding activity’).
1.4 Attitude to change
(pre-change)
Attitude to the drink-drive limit change before it was introduced, for example, ﬁrst impressions
upon hearing, fears and hopes.
1.5 Attitude to change
(current)
Current attitudes to the change including beliefs about the likely impact of the limit change on
drink-driving practices in Scotland.
1.6 Planning for change Actions taken to try and mitigate the impact of the limit change before it was put in place
including those who state that no action was taken.
1.7 Police enforcement Views or observations on approaches to police enforcement of the limit.
Theme 2: Changes in customer drinking behaviour and practices
Sub-theme Deﬁnition
2.1 Drinking behaviour Changes observed in time, style or volume of alcohol drinking. Any other changes in approach to
alcohol overtly or tacitly associated with the limit change. Groups or types of people perceived as
most affected.
2.3 Public attitudes and
knowledge
Customers’ attitudes and understanding of the limit change as expressed to license holders.
2.4 Beliefs about
drink-driving
Licensees’ attitudes toward drink-driving and their belief of prevalence of drink-driving. Excludes
their opinion of the efﬁcacy of lower limits in reducing drink-driving.
Theme 3: Changes in customer travel and transport options
Sub-theme Deﬁnition
3.1 Changes in customer
travel
Changes in travel mode to/from licensed premises. Groups or types of people most affected.
3.2 Business changes for
travel
Travel arrangements put in place by venues for customers.
Theme 4: Business adaptations
Sub-theme Deﬁnition
4.1 Alternatives to
alcohol
New or expanded provision, or increased marketing or promotional offers on, soft drinks, teas,
coffees, or no/low alcohol alternatives to alcohol. New or improved food offer to offset and loss
from alcohol reduction. New or improved entertainment offer.
4.2 Improved travel
options
Designated driver offers; partnerships with taxi drivers, efforts to make public transport easier and
more accessible.
4.3 Staff responses
(passive)
Responses of staff to direct questioning about alcohol limit including any formal training to help
them understand drink/drive limits or on appropriate action to take in response to a suspected
drink-driver.
4.4 Staff interventions
(active)
Active interventions taken by staff to reduce drink-driving including approaching customers or
clarifying if customers are driving before serving alcohol.
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Regarding the impact on other premises, golf clubs
were perceived as the hardest hit, particularly those
located in areas with limited public transport. Partici-
pants could not recall any venue closures as a result of
the limit change.
Changes in customer drinking behaviour and practices
Participants felt that drink-driving was rare in Scotland
and that public attitudes had signiﬁcantly shifted over
time to be less tolerant of the behaviour.
‘It used to be that if somebody was properly drunk and
was not able to stand you would take their keys off them,
you know, but those were in the days where people actu-
ally did drink and drive when they were well over the
limit and it was not seen as a stigma which it is now’.
[5: male; owner; independent free trade; pub and
restaurant; urban]
There was a general belief that more people had
stopped drinking alcohol if they had to drive. Partici-
pants thought that this change in behaviour had stem-
med from the public message ‘the best advice is none’,
which was promoted by the police when the limit was
changed [9]. Participants viewed this message as overly
stringent and believed that the economic impact on
their business would have been minimised if this pub-
lic message had been different.
Despite the belief that drink-driving was socially
unacceptable, many participants recalled recent inci-
dents when they were aware of customers drinking
alcohol and driving afterwards. Rural participants were
more likely to report such incidents and were also
more likely to report an increase in social isolation as
after-work drinking and socialisation during the week
had reduced since the limit change.
Participants described three groups of drinkers that
were particularly affected by the limit change. First and
most commonly mentioned was the ‘after-work drinker’
group, which mainly comprised of men who would have
dropped in on the way home from work. Participants
reported that this behaviour had declined and attributed
this to a public perception that the limit had changed
from a ‘two-pint limit’ to a ‘no pint limit’.
‘Especially people do not tend to come out at tea time as
much whereas they used to come out at tea time and just
have a couple of pints and still drive. Whereas now you
do not see that’. [1: male; manager; managed; hotel,
bar and restaurant; urban]
The second affected group comprised of the ‘next
morning driver’. Participants had observed that these
people were now ﬁnishing drinking earlier on most
nights, and particularly Sundays.
So Sunday to Thursday you might get somebody coming
in and having two, three, four pints up until midnight
but maybe driving the next day; they would not be driv-
ing straight after leaving the pub but they’d be driving
after they got up in the morning… …so they would go
home earlier or reduce the amount, or just not come out
at all. [14: male; business development manager;
tied tenanted/leased pubs; PubCo; urban]
A few participants, mostly from urban premises,
reported that they or their customers had invested in
personal breathalysers to better understand when they
were over the limit, particularly in relation to driving
the next day.
‘Yes, you know how you can get these breathalysers … I
remember a lot of them ﬂoating about at the time. And
people testing themselves and I think they were quite sur-
prised about how much alcohol was still in their system
the next morning. So they were very wary about drinking
in the evening when they were driving the next day’. [2:
female; owner; independent free trade; bar and res-
taurant; urban]
The third affected group comprised of the ‘lunch-
time drinker’, although these were reportedly less
affected by the limit change. In food-led establish-
ments, it was often female customers who would previ-
ously have shared a bottle of wine, or had single
glasses, but who now preferred to either have a desig-
nated driver or drink only soft drinks.
‘There was people who came in for lunch every week and
they now just have a soft drink with their lunch. I have
not lost their trade, they are still coming out for lunch
which is a bonus but they do not have any alcohol at all
now’. [11: female; owner; independent free trade;
restaurant; rural]
Changes in customer travel and transport options
Most participants, regardless of venue type or location,
felt that prior to the limit change, many customers
would either have drunk up to the old limit and driven,
or abstained when driving. They believed that drinkers
had now normalised to the change and had adapted
their behaviours so that they could drink as much or as
little as they wanted. For example, they reported that
customers had started to leave their cars at venues
overnight or were using designated drivers or public
transport more often. These behaviours had helped to
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mitigate any potential long-term economic impact on
business.
‘As time went on they started to use public transport and
came back into the bar but yes, there was deﬁnitely a lull
for a good six to eight months when it initially came into
force’. [2: female; owner; independent free trade; bar
and restaurant; urban]
Participants viewed transport to and from venues as
the customer’s responsibility and therefore most had
made little effort to improve transport options for cus-
tomers, despite this being considered a barrier to
drinking. There were no examples of transport being
paid for by the venue. One participant knew of a rural
hotel that offered a minibus service to customers, while
another knew a venue that provided transport at
Christmas for large booked parties.
A small number of participants from urban premises
had adopted a proactive approach to transportation by
developing a relationship with local taxi ﬁrms or offer-
ing a freephone to the taxi company. Other urban
venues also reported that they advertised public trans-
port information to customers.
Business adaptations
Participants described the limit change as one of many
government policies and cultural shifts to which their
businesses had to adapt. Participants from both urban
and rural areas placed the limit change in the context
of other factors including the global economic down-
turn, comparatively lower prices in the ‘off-trade’ (sales
of alcohol for consumption off the premises) sector,
and the rise of at-home drinking. Adapting to the legis-
lative change and customers’ expectations was seen as
key to a successful business; those that did not adapt
were more likely to have been affected economically.
Many participants had made positive changes and had
ﬂexible attitudes about what their business offered
consumers.
‘So we are quite happy to change to whatever means we
have to do. If the drink-driving limit has gone down then
we need to offer more different things to attract folk in…
…Generally some of the older style pubs do not really
cater for that and just do not want to know that like
really. So they might have lost out a bit on that’. [15:
male; manager; independent free trade; pub; urban]
The major change in practice was around the provi-
sion of alternatives to alcohol. While participants from
drink-only venues reported that their main income still
came from alcoholic drinks, others described a grow-
ing trend in customer demand for no/low-alcohol
drinks, and the range and quality of these drinks on
offer from manufacturers. Whereas previously only
one no/low-alcohol alternative would have been sold
(other than soft drinks), examples were given of
no/low-alcohol ranges intended to mimic the experi-
ence of drinking alcohol. This trend was primarily for
beer but also present in cider and wine. There was also
a smaller growth in the sale of hot drinks such as
coffee.
‘As I said the low alcohol, no alcohol beer and wine,
mocktails and soft drinks obviously became a big part of
what we do. We sell a lot of coffee and soft drinks with
our meals so that was really the plan, was to produce a
bigger range of soft drinks and non-alcoholic drinks’. [5:
male; owner; independent free trade; pub and res-
taurant; urban]
Another adaptation was to improve the presentation
of no/low-alcohol and other soft drinks, to make cus-
tomers feel that they were still consuming alcohol.
‘… it was making them feel part of the social crowd even
though they were not drinking, so we looked at different
glassware and how to present even a sparkling mineral
water, we made it look like a gin and tonic’. [14: male;
business development manager; tied tenanted/leased
pubs; PubCo; urban]
There were considerable efforts made by premises to
cater for designated drivers including free soft drinks,
free bottled water or promotional deals on soft drinks.
Although these initiatives were discussed in relation to
the limit change, and have increased since, they had
mostly been in place prior to the change. These initia-
tives were more common at Christmas time, though
many were offered year-round. Participants believed
that the limit change would have contributed to the
increased popularity and continuation of these
initiatives.
‘We already had an extensive range of soft drinks, in fact
we have got a fridge that contains nothing but low alco-
hol or non-alcohol beers and soft drinks … so it did not
feel as if we needed to do any more’. [6: male; owner;
independent free trade; pub; urban]
Although the majority of participants owned or man-
aged premises that provided food, only three men-
tioned improving the variety of food on the menu or
putting on special food offers, in response to the limit
change.
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‘There’s things I could do and did do in terms of trying
to increase the food at night time and therefore stimulate
a bit more on that and get people coming out for an eve-
ning meal when we did a couple of special events or
increase special events, which we still do’. [3: male;
owner; independent free trade; hotel; pub and res-
taurant; rural]
Discussion
Following the introduction of a lower drink-drive limit
in Scotland, owners/managers of licensed premises
reported that some of their customers had changed their
choices of drinking occasion, beverage and drinking
times, and that businesses had adapted accordingly with
most reporting minimal ﬁnancial impact. This is in line
with the recent ﬁnding that the limit change in Scotland
resulted in a 0.7% decrease in per-capita on-trade sales
[14]. Our ﬁndings suggest that any small fall in revenue
from alcohol sales is likely to have been replaced, at
least in part, by sales of non-alcoholic drinks or food.
A few participants reported a short-term impact due
to the limit change, which had lasted 6 to 12 months;
these accounts were consistent with media reports
dated a few months after the limit changed, which
suggested that the change had a large ﬁnancial impact
on on-premises retailers [17–19]. However, most par-
ticipants reported that overall, the limit change had lit-
tle impact on business, and that good businesses
should continuously adapt to a changing trading envi-
ronment. This view was echoed in later media reports
which suggested that struggling businesses needed
more innovation and investment, instead of attributing
their loss of revenue to the limit change [32]. In con-
trast, the Scottish Licensed Trade Association, a trade
body, has consistently expressed concern over the large
economic impact the limit change has had on on-trade
premises [19,32,33].
Participants from rural areas were more likely to
report negative impacts, however it was felt that the
limit change was one of many factors that negatively
affected business. The lack of alternative transport
options in rural areas may mean that drink-driving
laws could have a disproportionate, albeit small, effect
on rural premises. In these areas, further consideration
could be given to the availability of transport to and
from social venues, including pubs. Looking to the
future, automated ‘driverless’ cars may offer a solution
to the conﬂict between efforts to reduce drink-drive
casualties [34] and protecting social beneﬁts that may
arise from the availability of on-trade premises [35],
particularly in rural communities.
Participants from both urban and rural areas placed
the limit change in the context of other trends in the
wider economy and alcohol market. Others have
suggested a rise in in-home entertainment as an addi-
tional factor [35]. Scottish Government data on the
number of on-trade licences show a small increase in
the number of premises licensed to sell alcohol in
Scotland since the introduction of the limit change in
2014 [16] but the ﬁgures include both bars and restau-
rants and likely reﬂect wider market changes. Overall,
despite the reservations of participants (regardless of
premise type or location), there was broad acceptance
of the limit change, disapproval of drink-driving, and
little suggestion that the reduction should be reversed.
This is the ﬁrst qualitative study of licensee observa-
tions of, and responses to, a reduction in the drink-
driving limit. As a qualitative study it fulﬁlled its aim
of gaining insight into retailer and customer practices,
and adaptations to the limit change. The sample,
whilst diverse, was recruited mostly through an
industry-led award and accreditation scheme for bars
(BBN) and may therefore have included more well-
managed and innovative establishments than if we had
recruited by other means. Such premises may have
been better able to adapt and therefore less affected by
the limit change. Secondly, the premises rec-
ommended may have been less likely to present the
industry or BBN scheme in a negative light by
expressing opposition to the limit change or holding
controversial views. Third, the clientele of these venues
may also inﬂuence the impact of the limit change on
licensed venues, for example having customers with
higher disposable income. However, whilst our partici-
pants reported providing some non-alcoholic options,
their accounts and previous research suggest that they
could be considerably more proactive on this front
[36], perhaps supported by trade bodies. Additionally,
most of our participants owned or managed premises
located in urban areas; thus our ﬁndings may be less
likely to be reﬂective of wider views for rural licensees.
We did not interview any business owners that may
have ceased trading, however our participants were not
able to identify any occurrence as result of the limit
change. The speciﬁc impact of the limit change was dif-
ﬁcult for respondents to identify, and the time elapsed
since the change (approximately three years) may have
led to some failure to recall accurately. Our methods did
not allow us to account for the totality of the impact on
the licensed trade but they are in line with a quantitative
study showing minimal impact on alcohol sales [14].
Conclusion
This study has signiﬁcant implications for international
policymaking. Thirty-seven countries still have a BAC
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limit of 0.08%, and 31 countries have no BAC limit at
all [1]. There are ongoing legislative and advocacy
efforts to reduce the drink-drive limit in England [37]
and in New York [38] where a limit of 0.08% applies.
Such efforts face opposition to lower limits from com-
mercial interests [21,22,38,39]. Furthermore, other
countries such as Malta [40] which have recently made
the same changes, may face pressure to revert to a
0.08% BAC limit. The ﬁndings of our study ought to
provide policymakers with some reassurance that the
on-trade alcohol retail sector may be able to success-
fully adapt business practices and products offered in
the context of a reduced drink-drive limit.
In this ﬁrst study to examine how a lowering of the
legal drink-drive limit was experienced by bar owners or
managers, we found broad acceptance of the change, with
most reporting no persistent ﬁnancial impact on their
businesses, despite some changes in customer behaviour.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the support of the
Chief Scientist Ofﬁce (HIPS/16/49) for funding this
research. Many thanks also to Best Bar None for
assisting with recruitment and all the interviewees for
providing their time and opinions. We would also like
to thank all members of the advisory group for this
study for their input throughout this research.
Conﬂict of Interest
The research was funded by the Chief Scientist’s Ofﬁce,
Scotland (Grant HIPS/16/49). CS was funded by the
National Health Service as part of a placement through
the specialty training program in public health. None of
the researchers have any conﬂicts of interest to declare.
The authors have no conﬂicts of interest.
References
[1] World Health Organisation. Global status report on alcohol and health
2018. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2018 Available at: https://
www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_alcohol_report/gsr_
2018/en/ (accessed December 2018).
[2] Department for Transport. Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain:
Final Estimates Involving Illegal Alcohol Levels: 2017. (August 2019).
Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/827834/drink-drive-ﬁnal-estimates-
2017.pdf (accessed September 2019).
[3] Martineau F, Tyner E, Lorenc T, Petticrew M, Lock K. Population-level
interventions to reduce alcohol-related harm: an overview of systematic
reviews. Prev Med 2013;57:278–96.
[4] Killoran AA, Canning U, Doyle N, Sheppard L. Review of effectiveness of
laws limiting blood alcohol concentration levels to reduce alcohol-related
road injuries and deaths. London: Centre for Public Health Excellence
NICE, 2010.
[5] Fell JC, Voas RB. The effectiveness of a 0.05 blood alcohol concentra-
tion (BAC) limit for driving in the United States. Addiction 2013;109:
869–74.
[6] Yao J, Johnson MB, Tippetts S. Enforcement uniquely predicts reduc-
tions in alcohol-impaired crash fatalities. Addiction 2016;111:448–53.
[7] Miller TR, Levy DT, Swedler DI. Lives saved by laws and regulations
that resulted from the Bloomberg road safety program. Accid Anal Prev
2018;113:131–6.
[8] Fell JC, Scherer M. Estimation of the potential effectiveness of lowering
the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit for driving from 0.08 to
0.05 grams per deciliter in the United States. Alcohol Clin Exp Res
2017;41:2128–39.
[9] Scottish Government. Lower Drink Drive Limit (2014). Available at:
https://news.gov.scot/news/lower-drink-drive-limit-2 (accessed June 2018).
[10] European Transport Safety Council. Blood Alcohol Content (BAC)
Drink Driving Limits across Europe (2018). Available at: https://etsc.eu/
blood-alcohol-content-bac-drink-driving-limits-across-europe/ (accessed
July 2019).
[11] The UK Parliament. Scotland Act 2012. London: The Stationary Ofﬁce,
2012 Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/11/contents/
enacted (accessed July 2018).
[12] North P. Report of the review of drink and drug driving law. London:
Department for Transport, 2010 Available at: https://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100921035231/http://northreview.
independent.gov.uk/report (accessed Jan 2018).
[13] Scottish Government Social Research. Reducing the Drink Driving
Limit in Scotland: Analysis of Consultation Responses. 2013.
[14] Haghpanahan H, Lewsey J, Mackay DF et al. An evaluation of the effects
of lowering blood alcohol concentration limits for drivers on the rates of
road trafﬁc accidents and alcohol consumption: a natural experiment.
Lancet 2019;393:321–9.
[15] Giles L, Robinson M. Monitoring and evaluating Scotland’s alcohol
strategy: monitoring report 2018. Edinburgh: NHS Health Scotland,
2018.
[16] Scottish Government. Statistical Bulletin Crime and Justice Series: Scot-
tish Liquor Licensing Statistics 2016–17.
[17] Wright S. Scots Pubs Lose Millions After Drink Drive Changes. Herald
Scotland (March 2015). Available at: https://www.heraldscotland.com/
news/13206550.scots-pubs-lose-millions-after-drink-drive-changes/
(accessed May 2018).
[18] Ferguson J. Pub Proﬁts Still Plunging After Strain of Tough New Drink
Driving Limits Hammers Half of Scotland’s Boozers. Daily Record
(September 2015). Available at: https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/
scottish-news/pub-proﬁts-still-plunging-strain-6446192 ().
[19] Scottish Licensed Trade Association. Scottish on-trade market insight
report, Christmas/New Year 2015 (2016). Available at: http://www.
theslta.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/SCOTTISH-ON-TRADE-
REPORT-XMAS-NY-SURVEY-RESULTS-WEB-SITE-VERSION-
2015.pdf (accessed October 2018).
[20] Solomon RM, Chamberlain E, Usprich SJ. BAC to the future: moderniz-
ing the criminal drinking-driving threshold. Crim LQ 2007;52:35.
[21] Mencimer S. How the booze lobby has helped kill a law that would save
1,800 lives every year. Mother Jones (2018). Available at: https://www.
motherjones.com/food/2018/05/how-the-booze-lobby-has-helped-kill-a-
law-that-would-save-1800-lives-every-year/ (accessed Oct 2018).
[22] Mcguire A. Op-ed: Utah should not buy the fear-mongering of the alcohol
lobby. The Salt Lake Tribune (2017). Available at: http://archive.sltrib.
com/article.php?id=5423574&itype=CMSID (accessed January 2019).
[23] Gray G, Jones MD. A qualitative narrative policy framework? Examining
the policy narratives of US campaign ﬁnance regulatory reform. Public
Policy Adm 2016;31:193–220.
[24] Scottish Government. Deﬁning Scotland by Rurality (2018). Available at:
https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/About/Methodology/UrbanRural
Classiﬁcation (accessed July 2019).
[25] Mays N, Pope C. Rigour and qualitative research. BMJ 1995;311:
109–12.
[26] Best Bar None Scotland. About BBN (2019). Available at: https://www.
bbnscotland.co.uk/about-bbn/ (accessed February 2019).
[27] Eadie D, Stead M, MacKintosh AM et al. E-cigarette marketing in UK
stores: an observational audit and retailers’ views. BMJ Open 2015;5:
e008547.
178 C. Sumpter et al.
© 2019 The Authors. Drug and Alcohol Review published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of Australasian Professional Society on Alcohol and other Drugs
[28] Fitzgerald N, Nicholls J, Winterbottom J, Katikireddi S. Implementing a
public health objective for alcohol premises licensing in Scotland: a qual-
itative study of strategies, values, and perceptions of evidence. Int J Envi-
ron Res Public Health 2017;14:221.
[29] Fitzgerald N, Platt L, Heywood S, McCambridge J. Large-scale imple-
mentation of alcohol brief interventions in new settings in Scotland: a
qualitative interview study of a national programme. BMC Public Health
2015;15:289.
[30] Novick G. Is there a bias against telephone interviews in qualitative
research? Res Nurs Health 2008;31:391–8.
[31] Braun V, Clarke V. Thematic analysis. In: Cooper H, ed. APA handbook
of research methods in psychology: Vol. 2. Research designs.
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2012.
[32] Scott K. Buzzworks director says ﬁrm will get bigger and pubs can’t blame
drink driving changes for sales slump. The Herald (2018). Available at:
https://www.heraldscotland.com/business_hq/15905871.buzzworks-director-
says-ﬁrm-will-get-bigger-and-pubs-cant-blame-drink-driving-changes-for-
sales-slump/ (accessed July 2019).
[33] Scottish Licensed Trade. Alcohol laws are ‘not working’. Scottish
Licensed Trade News (2018). Available at: https://sltn.co.uk/2018/10/25/
alcohol-laws-are-not-working/ (accessed July 2019).
[34] National Transport Commission. Changing driving laws to support auto-
mated vehicles. Melbourne: National Transport Commission, 2017
Available at: https://www.ntc.gov.au/Media/Reports/(E5695ACE-993C-
618F-46E1-A876391B8CD9).pdf (accessed August 2018).
[35] Cabras I, Reggiani C. Village pubs as a social propellant in rural areas:
an econometric study. J Environ Plan Manag 2010;53:947–62.
[36] Willoughby L, Tolvi J. Working with pubs and bars to improve their offer
to customers who drink less or not at all. London: Nudging Pubs, 2016
Available at: http://nudgingpubs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
Nudging-Pubs-2016.pdf (accessed October 2018).
[37] Road Safety GB. Government ‘Interested’ in Lower Drink-Drive Evidence
(November 2018). Available at: http://roadsafetygb.org.uk/news/government-
interested-in-lower-drink-drive-limit-evidence/ (accessed August 2019).
[38] Eberhart C. Rockland/Westchester journal news. State bill would slash
legal drinking limit (April 2019). Available at: https://eu.lohud.com/story/
news/2019/04/27/new-york-state-bill-would-slash-legal-drinking-limit/
3502228002/ (accessed August 2019).
[39] Andrew Mcguire. The Salt Lake Tribune. Op-ed: Utah should not buy
the fear-mongering of the alcohol lobby (June 2017). Available at:
https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=5423574&itype=CMSID
(accessed August 2018).
[40] Carabott S. Times Malta 2018. Drink-drive limits for motorists to be
slashed - motorcyclists among vehicles that will have even lower allow-
ance. Available at: https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/drink-drive-
limits-for-motorists-to-be-slashed.693190 (accessed August 2019).
Drink-drive limit impact on bars 179
© 2019 The Authors. Drug and Alcohol Review published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of Australasian Professional Society on Alcohol and other Drugs
